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REPORT BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON
THE UNITED NATIONS OPERATION IN CYPRUS, FOR THE PERIOD
26 APRIL TO 8 JUNE 1964

INTRODUCTION

1. In accordance with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964 (S/5575), the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus was assembled and placed under the command of Lt. General P.S. Gyani of India. After an initial period devoted to deployment, the Force became operational on 27 March 1964. The Security Council resolution states that it is the task of the Force, in the interest of international peace and security,

- (a) to prevent a recurrence of fighting;
- (b) to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order;
- (c) to contribute to a return to normal conditions.

2. On 11 May 1964, Mr. Galo Plaza of Ecuador was appointed by the Secretary-General as his Special Representative in Cyprus to conduct discussions and negotiations with the parties concerned towards achieving the objectives of UNFICYP's mandate as outlined in paragraph 4 of the Secretary-General's Report to the Security Council on 29 April 1964.

3. The present report covers the period from 26 April 1964 to 8 June 1964. On some occasions, and in order to present a more comprehensive and clear picture, some actions during all the period of UNFICYP's presence in Cyprus are reported. The report comprises the following sections:

- I. Military Situation
- II. Political Aspects
- III. Economic, Social and Judiciary Aspects
- IV. UNFICYP's Programme of Action (as set forth in paragraph 3 of annex I of Security Council document S/5671)
- V. Summing Up and Observations.

I

MILITARY SITUATION

4. Composition, including changes in this period

(a) Composition. As of 8 June 1964, the strength of the Force was as follows:

(1) <u>Military</u>	
Austria	55
Canada	1,122
Denmark	676
Finland	1,000
Ireland	639
Sweden	954
United Kingdom	<u>1,792</u>
TOTAL	<u>6,238</u>

(2) <u>Police</u>	
Australia	40
Austria	33
Denmark	40
New Zealand	20
Sweden	<u>40</u>
TOTAL	<u>173</u>

(3) TOTAL UNFICYP 6,411

(b) Changes during this period

(1) Arrivals (Military)

(a) The fly-in of 677 men of the Danish Contingent was completed on 22 May. A further 300 are due to arrive on the 11/12 June.

(b) The Austrian Field Hospital was complete and operating in support of UNFICYP by 17 May.

(c) The Swedish Contingent was reinforced by eighty-eight men from the Congo during May. The fly-in was completed on 13 May.

(2) Arrivals (Civilian Police)

(a) Five Austrian policemen arrived on 2 May to join the twenty-eight already in Cyprus.

(b) The Swedish police group was complete by 6 May.

(c) The New Zealand police group was complete by 22 May.

(d) The Australian and Danish police groups were complete by 25 May.

(3) Departures

(a) 1st Battalion the Parachute Regiment was released from United Nations command on 2 May and has returned to the United Kingdom.

(b) G Battery 7 Parachute Light Regiment was released from United Nations command on 5 May and has returned to the United Kingdom.

(c) All administrative units of 16 Parachute Brigade Group were released from United Nations command by 13 May, and have returned to the United Kingdom.

(d) 1st Battalion the Sherwood Foresters was released from United Nations command on 27 May, and has returned to the United Kingdom.

(e) Based on the experience of two months' operations, it has been found possible to reduce the air component of the Force to three fixed wing aircraft, three rotary wing for reconnaissance and liaison and four rotary wing for troop lift, supply and casualty evacuation. Surplus air units were released from the Force from 5 June.

5. Deployment of the Force

The Force is currently deployed in Cyprus as follows:

(a) Nicosia Zone

HQ UNFICYP (International)

HQ Nicosia Zone (Basic organization Canadian, with representative staff of contingents under command)

Austrian field hospital and civilian police

Canadian Contingent

Danish Contingent (including Danish civilian police)

Finnish Contingent

United Kingdom Contingent (less one battalion, one battery and two armoured car squadrons)

- (b) Paphos Zone
Swedish Contingent (including Swedish civilian police)
- (c) Famagusta District
Irish Contingent
Australian civilian police, one section
- (d) Larnaca District
One battalion and one armoured car squadron of United Kingdom Contingent
Australian civilian police, one section
- (e) Limassol District
One armoured car squadron and one battery of United Kingdom Contingent
New Zealand civilian police

6. Details of UNFICYP deployment are shown on the attached map.

Summary of shooting incidents and casualties

7. Shooting incidents and casualties reported during the period 2 May to 8 June are summarized below. The summary excludes the almost daily exchanges of fire that occur without casualties, especially between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots on the Dhikomo ridge east of the Kyrenia Pass. Similarly, no reference is made to the frequent reports of shots fired by both sides in and around Nicosia, especially in the northern suburbs where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in fortified houses and well-prepared defensive positions confront each other at close quarters.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Zone/District</u>	<u>Casualties</u>
2 May	Ghaziveran	Paphos	4 Turkish Cypriots wounded by parcel bomb.
2 May	Kouklia	Paphos	1 Greek Cypriot policeman accidentally shot dead by Greek Cypriots.
4 May	Nicosia city	Nicosia	2 UNFICYP (UK) soldiers slightly injured by a grenade.
4 May	Alevga	Paphos	1 Turkish Cypriot wounded.
5 May	Geunyely	Nicosia	1 Greek Cypriot shot dead.
6 May	Famagusta	Famagusta	1 Turkish Cypriot shot dead.
11 May	Aghirda	Nicosia	1 Turkish Cypriot wounded accidentally (self-inflicted).

<u>Date</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Zone/District</u>	<u>Casualties</u>
11 May	Famagusta	Famagusta	2 Greek Army officers shot dead. 1 Greek Cypriot policeman shot dead. 1 Turkish Cypriot shot dead. 1 Turkish Cypriot wounded. 1 Greek Army officer wounded.
14 May	Louroujina	Nicosia	1 Turkish Cypriot wounded.
14 May	Margi	Nicosia	1 Greek Cypriot shot dead.
14 May	Pileri	Nicosia	1 Turkish Cypriot shot dead.
17 May	Margi	Nicosia	1 Turkish Cypriot wounded.
20 May	Yerolakkos	Nicosia	1 UNFICYP (Finnish) soldier shot dead.
28 May	Vrecha	Paphos	1 Turkish Cypriot woman shot dead.

<u>Summary:</u>	<u>Killed</u>	<u>Wounded</u>
UNFICYP	1	2
Greek Cypriots	4	-
Turkish Cypriots	4	9
Greek Army	2	1
TOTAL	11	12

Incidents involving UNFICYP personnel

8. Since 2 May, there have been five cases of fire being deliberately directed at UNFICYP personnel. The first was on 4 May, when two UNFICYP soldiers of the United Kingdom Contingent on patrol at night in Nicosia walled city were slightly injured by the explosion of two grenades thrown by an unknown assailant.
9. The second incident occurred during the night of 19 May, when another grenade was thrown at two UNFICYP soldiers, also of the United Kingdom Contingent, in Nicosia walled city, this time without injury. Again, the identity of the assailant was not established.

10. The third incident, in which an UNFICYP soldier of the Finnish contingent was killed, occurred during the night of 20 May. UNFICYP troops were fired on by Turkish Cypriots near Kanli, west of Nicosia, while recovering an UNFICYP vehicle which had broken down. A patrol from the Finnish battalion went to investigate and also came under fire. Fire was then returned by the UNFICYP troops, and during the exchange of shots a Finnish soldier was hit three times and killed. UNFICYP troops were finally able to disarm the Turkish Cypriots, who insisted that they thought they were under attack by Greek Cypriots. This was despite the fact that the UNFICYP troops had called out to identify themselves during a lull in the firing.

11. The fourth incident occurred on 26 May, in daylight. UNFICYP troops of the Canadian contingent escorting Greek Cypriot harvesters were fired on by Turkish Cypriots from the area of St. Hilarion Castle. During this incident, some 250 rounds were deliberately fired at the UNFICYP troops as they attempted to move up to the Turkish Cypriot positions and obtain a cease-fire. Eventually the UNFICYP troops were forced to return the fire and the situation was swiftly brought under control. There were no casualties during the incident.

12. The fifth incident also occurred in daylight on 26 May, again on the Kyrenia range. Greek Cypriots in defensive positions west of St. Hilarion Castle fired some fifty shots at Swedish members of the UNFICYP Civilian Police who were investigating a report of two bodies being found in the area. Although the Greek Cypriots claimed that this was a case of mistaken identity, their explanation was not accepted. The range was only 500 yards, and the men and vehicles fired on were clearly identifiable as belonging to UNFICYP.

13. Missing United Nations Officer. Major E.F.L. Macey and his driver, Leonard Platt, both members of the United Nations Force from the United Kingdom contingent, have been missing since 1200 hours (GMT) on 7 June 1964. Their vehicle, an UNFICYP Landrover, is also missing. Major Macey was appointed as Liaison Officer to the Vice-President's Office. He was on duty in the area of Galatia (northeast Cyprus in the peninsula). It is feared that they were abducted while returning to Nicosia.

... them. The President of Cyprus has condemned the abductions and in response to UNFICYP protests about them, has stated that such acts are harmful to Greek Cypriot prestige, agreed to release all hostages actually in the hands of the Government, but seriously fears for the lives of most of the hostages taken in and around Famagusta. The over-all effects of the Famagusta incident, which is still under investigation by UNFICYP Civilian Police, have been to raise the barriers of fear and suspicion between the two communities, to restrict even further the movement of the Turkish Cypriot community throughout the island, and to initiate a wave of bitter anti-Turkish Cypriot feeling among the Greek Cypriots.

Interference with air-traffic control by a pirate radio station

19. On 28 May the Nicosia fly-over air traffic control frequency of 126.5 M/C was interfered with by a pirate radio station. Interference was weak at first but became stronger the following days. On the night of 3/4 June, various fixes were obtained which led UNFICYP to believe that the station was operating in the Aghirda/St. Hilarion area controlled by Turkish Cypriots. The quality and strength of the signals emitted by this station, as well as its knowledge and use of the codes employed by air traffic control, revealed the high technical level of the personnel and equipment involved. UNFICYP has conducted a search in the St. Hilarion Castle and surrounding area without finding the transmitter. However, as from the time that the search was conducted, the pirate station ceased to operate until the night of 13/14 June. The operations of this station not only increases tension by virtue of the suspicions aroused as to its purposes but also creates an actual and serious air safety hazard for aircraft on normal flights in and out of Cyprus.

General Situation

20. There has been no military incident during the past six weeks involving major clashes by either side but both sides have taken advantage of the comparative lull in activity to strengthen their military positions in Nicosia and suburbs and to improve their ability to undertake operations in the future.

Build-up of Arms and War Equipment

21. There is considerable evidence that both the Government and the Turkish Cypriot community are getting possession of more and more arms and ammunition, including heavy weapons, and are acquiring them to the maximum extent dependent on the sources and facilities available to them. During the last month both communities in Cyprus

have shown an increased number of weapons and equipment. This increase apparently comes from different sources. On the Greek Cypriot side, many armoured vehicles have been displayed since the EOKA Day parade which took place in April. Some of the armoured vehicles are crudely made by adapting bull-dozers and landrovers, others are evidently imported vehicles, such as the Marmon Herringtons. There has been no attempt by the Greek Cypriot authorities to hide the fact that vehicles have been armoured. Greek Cypriots have actually been seen at work armouring bull-dozers in Nicosia, Trikomo and Polis. These bull-dozers have quite openly been used in the fighting at Limassol, Ktima, Kokkina and Ghaziveran. There has also been wide publicity in the Greek Cypriot press about the manufacture of grenades on the island. Even though these grenades are probably being only cleaned and reassembled in the factories, it is estimated that many hundreds of grenades can be turned out every day at Limassol and Xeros.

22. The Greek Cypriot authorities have also confirmed their intention to purchase heavy weapons, ammunition, aircraft and vehicles abroad. Some aircraft have already arrived on the island. It is believed that these aircraft are small observation type planes and small Bell type helicopters. There is also an indication of the arrival of equipment in Limassol where heavily guarded convoys were observed by UNFICYP moving from the port to the Troodos area.

23. On the Turkish Cypriot side, there has been a noticeable increase in the number and type of weapons used by their fighting elements. Recently, a greater number of machine guns, bazookas and mortars have been observed by the United Nations troops. Since the Turkish Cypriot community cannot officially import weapons, it must be assumed that these weapons are being smuggled into the island. The United Nations troops have been patrolling the beaches and possible landing areas, but no positive results have been obtained to date. There is no indication that the Turkish Cypriots have any organized manufacture of weapons on the island. Only some primitive shotguns and "pipe bombs" made with sawn off lengths of piping are known to be manufactured on the island by the Turkish community.

24. Nicosia town and its suburbs is now the main centre of tension in Cyprus. In this area, both sides have continued to improve and develop their fortifications. The other area where the two sides are occupying military positions and facing each other is astride the Nicosia/Kyrenia road in the Pentadaktylos range of hills (Kyrenia pass, St. Hilarion Castle area). There is also considerable tension in the north-west of Cyprus, particularly in the areas of Lefka, Xeros, Mansoura, Kokkina. In these areas both sides are extremely distrustful of each other's

intention and are taking all military precautions against aggressive action by either party.

25. It is unlikely that there will be any relaxation of tension in these areas so long as there is no indication of any acceptable political solution in Cyprus. The decision of the Government of Cyprus to introduce conscription and organize and equip an army has on the contrary increased the tension in that the Turkish Cypriots may increase further their efforts to build up fortifications, provide themselves with more arms, and organize themselves more on military lines. Militarily, the situation has been contained, but it is increasingly evident that it may not remain so for long. There is increased belief that there is no likelihood of a political solution in the immediate future and there is a misgiving on the part of the Government that the present situation may be frozen in a manner contrary to its political aims and also contrary to its aim to regain control over the whole island. It is feared that in the attempt to restore law, order and normality, violence and fighting may again break out.

Nicosia

26. As stated above, tension in Nicosia remains at a high pitch with each side encroaching more and more with fortifications in the area of the Green Line. These fortifications are, in many cases, in close proximity to one another and are manned day and night by both sides. There is a permanent danger that any minor incident on the Green Line could rapidly escalate into a situation which would not only be hazardous for troops of UNFICYP, but also result in heavy casualties to both sides.

27. In the northern suburb of Trakhanas particularly, where the Turkish Cypriots derive a certain confidence from the location of the regular Turkish Contingent, these fortifications present a permanent hazard to troops of UNFICYP holding positions between the two sides. It has been made clear to both sides that the construction of further posts and fortifications, which contribute to this deteriorating situation, will result in their being removed by troops of UNFICYP, if necessary by the use of force.

28. Turkish Cypriots continue to refuse access by Greek Cypriots into the Turkish sector of Nicosia and deny the Government department the use of Government offices and stores in the Turkish sector. This refusal has given rise to a particularly thorny problem, since the Government, asserting its right to use the offices and stores, has asked the Commander of UNFICYP to ensure the Government's access to these establishments or else to stand aside and let the Government regain control

of the offices and stores. The reopening of the seed-cleaning plant, to which reference is made in Section III (Economic, Social and Judiciary Aspects), is especially urgent.

Kyrenia

29. Apart from regular minor shooting incidents, some of which appear to have been deliberately aimed at troops of UNFICYP and the UNFICYP Civilian Police, neither side has made any attempt to advance from or improve the positions now held. The Turkish Cypriots continue to hold dominating features astride the road from Nicosia to Kyrenia and in the Kyrenia Pass, and control all movement northwards from Nicosia.

30. Although better armed with heavy weapons and in greater numerical strength, there are no signs of the Greek Cypriots resuming their attacks in the St. Hilarion area, and the location of permanent UNFICYP posts with the forward troops of both sides has clearly acted as a deterrent to any positive offensive action.

31. In the light of recent incidents which have endangered the lives of men of the Force, it has been made clear to both sides that a repetition of such incidents will result in the removal of any post used as a base for fire against troops of UNFICYP, using force if necessary after due warning has been given.

Ktima

32. The principal aim of the United Nations Force in Ktima has been to bring about the removal of all fortifications erected during the Ktima fighting. The Turkish Cypriots made the first moves, and the Greek Cypriots finally agreed to remove their fortifications after the President had visited the town on 6 May.

33. By 25 May all sandbags had been removed except those at Greek Cypriot police posts and stations, and by the beginning of June the electricity was again working effectively in the Turkish Cypriot quarter. The Turkish Cypriots are, however, still surrounded by a number of Greek Cypriot posts, although only one of these positions is fortified. There is no longer any restriction on movement in and out of the Turkish sector, although the Greek police and National Guard are keeping a close watch for Turkish extremists.

34. It is possible that the TMT (the extremist Turkish Cypriot organization) leaders in Ktima are anxious to retain a certain tension among the Turkish Cypriot population, perhaps because they believe that this will ensure ready support if the over-all Turkish Cypriot policy is to become more aggressive.

Polis

35. The situation in Polis is now generally calm. The Turkish Cypriots of the town, who for a considerable time were besieged in the school, are no longer under siege but still concentrate in the school area under somewhat cramped living conditions. However, freedom of movement along the roads to all traffic has been restored. The Turkish Cypriots desire United Nations escort but this is considered unnecessary in view of the fact that United Nations troops patrol all key points along the main roads. Some fortifications have been removed and there is at present no fortification problem in this area. Both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are working in the Limni mines in the vicinity of Polis.

Ayios Theodoros

36. A major incident in this village was averted by intervention of UNFICYP as a result of which a strong United Nations force was deployed in the area including a permanent detachment of the UNFICYP Civilian Police.

37. Although mistrust still exists, a measure of confidence among the villagers has been restored and a detachment of the Gendarmerie located in a position overlooking the village has been withdrawn. There is now free movement in the village itself and along roads leading to it, although a major incident provoked by extremists is still a possibility.

Louroujina

38. This village is an isolated Turkish Cypriot stronghold under TMT influence in an otherwise Greek Cypriot area. The population is estimated at 4,000, of whom a large number are armed.

39. A tense situation developed there following the alleged shooting by Greek Cypriot irregulars of a Turkish Cypriot from the village travelling in a bus from Nicosia. As a result, a Greek Cypriot force from the nearby village of Lymbia faced Turkish Cypriot positions surrounding Louroujina and fire was exchanged but, after a period of negotiation, both sides agreed to abandon their positions and return to their respective villages.

40. The potential threat from Louroujina is reflected against the isolated Turkish Cypriot villages of Margi and Kochati some seven miles to the west, whose inhabitants are not well armed. Any provocation in this area could lead to reprisals on Margi or Kochati by Greek Cypriots.

Kokkina - Lefka - Xeros

41. The Government's preoccupation in this area is concerned mainly with anti-invasion preparations and the belief that mainland Turks and Turkish arms are being smuggled into the area from the sea. Turkish Cypriot influence in the area is strong and Lefka remains a controlling Turkish Cypriot stronghold. Against this, strong National Guard contingents have been located in the area, especially at Xeros.
42. Freedom of movement along the coast road fluctuates according to the situation.

Assessment of Cypriot Armed Forces

43. The Cyprus Regular Police and Gendarmerie were recently amalgamated to form one police force. Numbers of Special Police and Gendarmerie, previously considered as policemen, have been transferred into the National Guard, and it is estimated that the Regular Police Force is now 5,000 strong. It is armed and, although earmarked for police duties, is quite capable of military action, particularly in towns where the National Guard would probably operate in support of the police.

44. The National Guard is at present estimated to be 15,000 strong and some of its elements have been under very uncertain Government control.

General Karayannis, a retired Lieutenant-General in the Greek Army, has been appointed to command in an effort to bring the force under stricter discipline, and the recently approved Conscription Bill will result in an influx of youths between 18 and 20 years of age. The force has a plentiful supply of small arms and is rapidly being equipped with modern heavy weapons. The aircraft recently imported for police duties can be expected to operate in support of the National Guard.

45. The Greek Cypriot element of the old Cyprus Army appears to be entirely engaged in training the National Guard and most Greek Cypriot officers have been incorporated into it.

46. Almost all the original Turkish members of the Cypriot Police Force and Gendarmerie and the Turkish element of the Cypriot Army have retained their arms. There are also undoubtedly a number of additional Turkish police recruited since 21 December wearing police uniform, and a considerable number of other Turkish Cypriot armed men with weapons which include machine guns and, in some cases, mortars and bazookas, defending the areas of Turkish Cypriot population throughout the Island. There is also the extremist Turkish Cypriot organization (TMT) which operates very independently under the orders and control of its own leaders and is believed to be only rather tenuously subject to the authority of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.

47. On the Greek Cypriot side, there are also large numbers of men capable of taking up arms at very short notice to reinforce the National Guard. There are times when these men appear to act on their own independently of any control. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the same is true on the Turkish Cypriot side.

48. Both sides at present have the potential to engage in military operations on a considerable scale and this potential is being improved upon as quickly as the situation will allow.

Freedom of movement on the roads

49. Since 4 April, when agreements were reached between UNFICYP and the two communities, a slow improvement has been evident in the free use of roads throughout Cyprus. The exception to this was and continues to be the use of the Nicosia-Kyrenia road, which is firmly in Turkish Cypriot hands and its use denied to the Greek Cypriots. Elsewhere in the island, the only other main road controlled by Turkish Cypriots is that which extends west from Xeros through the Turkish Cypriot villages of Limmitis, Mansoura and Kokkina. Otherwise the Cyprus Government forces control road movement. Turkish Cypriots, compelled for economic reasons to undertake journeys between the towns and outlying villages, are subjected to checks and searches by Greek Cypriot policemen and have little confidence as regards their personal safety.

50. The fear and mistrust that followed the disappearance of the thirty-two Turkish Cypriot hostages after the incident in Famagusta on 11 May brought all Turkish Cypriot road movement to a halt. Since then, the only major movement undertaken by the Turkish Cypriot community has been under United Nations escort. In consequence, to avoid suffering and hardship and to restore some measure of normality, UNFICYP has become heavily committed to escorting the movement of food, essential merchandise and individuals on the roads of Cyprus. This policy has been kept constantly under review and, from 7 June, UNFICYP escorts have been provided only for urgent humanitarian reasons. To avoid abduction or interference with free movement by unauthorized persons, UNFICYP patrols in sensitive areas are being increased, and regular supervision organized at road blocks and checks manned by Greek Cypriot policemen of the Cyprus police.

Harvest arrangements

51. One of the main factors contributing to the calm since 2 May has been the mutual interest of both communities in gathering the harvest. UNFICYP has been fully deployed to assist this. Liaison has been provided between the two communities and UNFICYP escorts have ensured the safety of harvesters, where the fields of one community adjoin those of the other. Arrangements have been

undertaken to enable farmers to have their crops harvested in areas which have been abandoned.

52. UNFICYP is also assisting in the collection and centralization of that part of the 1963 grain harvest that has remained in Turkish Cypriot grain stores as a result of the inter-communal fighting. The assistance is expected to continue until the middle of June.

53. The harvesting has provided the opportunity for contacts to be renewed between the two communities, and has demonstrated that the will and ability to live and work together still exists.

UNFICYP Civilian Police

54. Whenever the UNFICYP Civilian Police have been deployed in Zones and Districts, both the uniformed and the Investigation branch have undertaken tasks under the general headings mentioned in the last report. The uniformed branch has been particularly active in supervising the searches carried out at roadblocks by Greek Cypriot policemen and have, by their presence, prevented excessive and humiliating searches of Turkish Cypriots. The Investigation branch has undertaken, amongst many other tasks, enquiries into the following cases:

(a) Murder	-	ten cases
(b) Explosions	-	two cases
(c) Missing persons	-	three cases

55. UNFICYP Civilian Police Liaison Officers are established at the Cyprus Police Headquarters in Nicosia and at Headquarters UNFICYP, and the intention is to provide a similar liaison between the UNFICYP Civilian Police, the Cyprus Police and the local military headquarters in each Zone and District.

Logistical Support

56. The arrangement by which logistical support is provided to UNFICYP, mainly by the United Kingdom supported through its national contingent and United Nations channels, continues to work very satisfactorily.

Assessment of progress made

57. An assessment of the progress made in the military field toward achieving the objectives set out in Annex 1 to the report dated 29 April shows that there

is still far to go. The presence of the United Nations Force has clearly prevented a recurrence of open fighting during the period under review. However, hopes of achieving full freedom of movement on the roads diminished after the Famagusta shooting incident on 11 May, and the two communities are still far from achieving a state of peaceful co-existence. Some defortification has taken place in Ktima, but no major progress towards removing defensive positions has been made elsewhere in the island. No progress has been made toward the progressive disarming of civilians, many of whom continue to roam the island free of any control.

58. It is hoped that the appointment of General Karayannis to command the National Guard will result in the extremists on the Greek Cypriot side being brought under control. The introduction of conscription may also help to reduce and discipline the numbers of armed irregulars at present at large in the island. Little is known about any efforts being made to restrain the extremist Turkish Cypriot element (TMT) and to bring them under control.

59. The harvest, however, has been largely gathered by both communities, due mainly to the escorts for harvesters of both communities provided by United Nations troops. As reported elsewhere in this report, the harvesting period served to bring both communities more closely together, and demonstrated that the ability and desire of certain elements of both sides to live and work together peacefully still exists.

II

POLITICAL ASPECTS

60. During the period covered by this report, regular contacts have been continued at all levels with Government authorities, leaders and responsible persons from both communities, as well as with representatives of public life and of the business community. These contacts have been most useful in order to ascertain the different points of view concerning the approaches and solutions of the day-to-day problems and in order to make suggestions regarding the return to normality. The points mentioned in Annex I of the Secretary-General's report S/5671 have always been kept in mind during these exploratory discussions. An account of the most important political aspects covering the period in this report is given below.

61. Withdrawal of fortifications. In order to reduce tension, especially in areas like Nicosia, and the Kyrenia range, efforts had been made to reach an arrangement for the withdrawal or elimination of fortifications. Proposals had been put forward both to the Government and to the Turkish Cypriot leaders, including different plans, especially for the removal of fortifications in the city of Nicosia, and in the Kyrenia range. Unfortunately, no consensus or agreement has yet been reached and in both these areas no progress has been made on the matter. However, during recent discussions, it has seemed that some possibilities exist for unilateral action on the part of the Government in the removal of fortifications, on a gradual basis. As reported in paragraphs 31-33 above, positive results have been achieved in the town of Ktima during the past weeks and practically all fortifications have been removed and public utilities, such as water and electricity, have been restored in the Turkish Cypriot sector of this city. In Famagusta, also, it has been possible to obtain the removal of some of the fortifications established there after the incident of 11 May 1964.

62. Missing persons. The question of missing persons remains one of the most serious causes of tension and distrust between the two communities, especially after the Famagusta incident.

63. It has been indicated that during the three days that followed this incident, thirty-two Turkish Cypriots were taken as hostages. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continues to be mainly responsible for the tracing of

missing persons and hostages, and UNFICYP is trying to give the Committee all possible assistance in its work. On the other hand, on different occasions, representations have been made to the Government of Cyprus calling its attention to the fact that persons are missing or had been taken as hostages and informing the Government that this was a matter of grave concern, both to UNFICYP and to international public opinion. In spite of UNFICYP's repeated requests, no definite information has been received concerning the whereabouts of any of the hostages taken after the Famagusta incident, or of most of the missing persons. Some investigations carried out by UNFICYP Civilian Police have not yet produced any satisfactory results.

64. According to information supplied on 8 June by the representatives of the ICRC, 78 Turkish Cypriots and 8 Greek Cypriots are reported to be missing since UNFICYP became operational on 27 March. The total number of missing Turkish Cypriots is reported to be 483 and that of Greek Cypriots to be 52. As of 8 June, a total of 43 Turkish Cypriots had been removed from the list of missing persons since 27 March. It is a matter of particular concern to UNFICYP that all efforts to obtain information concerning the fate of the hostages taken by the Greek Cypriot irregulars after the Famagusta incident on 11 May 1964 have failed.

65. Armaments. During the period covered by this report it has been noticed that the quantity of armaments in the possession of both communities is increasing. As reported in the chapter on the Military Situation, it is suspected that arms for the Turkish Cypriots have been introduced in the Kokkina-Mansoura area. The Government, on the other hand, has openly imported arms, indicating that, as any sovereign Government, it has the right to do so. This increase in armaments has contributed to a rise in tension, especially in some sensitive areas.

66. Conscription. Parliament approved on 1 June a law establishing compulsory conscription for persons between the ages of 18 to 50. The law authorizes the Council of Ministers to establish a force called the National Guard when, in its opinion, there is a threat of invasion or of any attempt against the independence or the territorial integrity of the Republic, or when lives or property of the citizens are threatened. In accordance with this law, the Council of Ministers has recently decided to call up for service when considered necessary the first three classes - the 18, 19 and 20 year old age groups.

67. Irregular elements. It is felt that the action of irresponsible armed men on both sides is one of the main causes of many of the incidents which have occurred during the period under review. These same elements are also mainly responsible for the disappearance of persons and for the taking of innocent people as hostages. In many cases it is clear that these irresponsible elements are not willing to accept the instructions or follow the guidance given by the leaders of their communities, thus resulting in greater difficulty for UNFICYP to negotiate some problems at the leadership levels.

68. Freedom of movement in towns and villages. Movement of members of the two communities into each other's sectors is extremely restricted. In towns and mixed villages the two communities are confined to movement within their own sectors. This has not made much difference from the residential point of view, as separation was also the residential pattern before the disturbances, but it has adversely affected, particularly in Nicosia, the working of Greek Cypriot industrial and commercial enterprises and the use of Government premises located in the Turkish sectors, as well as some Turkish Cypriot enterprises located in areas now controlled by the Government security forces. It has also affected the problem of law and order in that Greek Cypriot policemen of the Police Force are not permitted to enter predominantly Turkish Cypriot areas and the Government does not recognize the authority of the Turkish Cypriot policemen for the reason that the latter do not accept the authority of the Chief of Police and the Minister of the Interior. The problem of freedom of movement on main roads has been dealt with in Section I, paragraphs 48-49.

69. Local press. The irresponsible, inaccurate, highly emotional reporting of the local press has worked at cross purposes with any effort by the authorities to subdue violent reactions in civilian sectors over which they have uncertain control. On the contrary, the substance and the tone of their publications have served constantly to inflame public opinion.

70. Displaced persons. Immediately after the disturbances in December 1963, and subsequently during January, a large number of Turkish Cypriot villagers from some of the mixed villages and from some of the very small Turkish villages, moved out into the more predominantly Turkish villages and towns, and there has been a fairly large influx into Nicosia. This has created the problem of food supplies, accommodation, rehabilitation and care and maintenance of their properties. Details are given in Section III, paragraph 70 (g).

III

ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND JUDICIARY ASPECTS

71. Although in the political field very few positive results have been achieved, some progress can be reported during this period in the solution of specific economic, social and judicial problems.

Government property

72. Seed cleaning Plant. This plant is very important for the economy of Cyprus and for both communities, and its operation has become urgent in order to prepare the seeds for the next agricultural season. The plant, which is Government property, is located in the Turkish Cypriot Sector of Nicosia near the Cease-Fire Line. Both sides agreed to the details for the operation of the plant, including the man-power to be used. However, some difficulties have arisen for the cleaning and repair of the machinery. It is hoped, however, that a solution will be found soon for its re-opening. Guarding of the plant has been arranged and protection will be provided by UNFICYP when it again commences operation.

73. Government Stores. Several of the principal Government Stores in Nicosia lie in the area most affected by the disturbances in December. At that time, and in some cases subsequently, these stores have suffered structural damages and been exposed to looting. UNFICYP has surveyed the situation in detail and prepared a plan for the safeguarding of all remaining stores and equipment and making the most important buildings more secure. The plan has been submitted to the authorities concerned and, if approved, could be implemented within a period of two weeks.

Electricity Supply in the Turkish Cypriot Sector, Nicosia

74. Electricity is still supplied to the Turkish Cypriot Sector but the proper function of the Electricity Authority of Cyprus in that Sector has been paralysed since January last. Turkish Cypriot employees of EAC last January discontinued work under the EAC Authority and procedure, and froze the collection account for EAC in their Sector. Due to UNFICYP efforts the matter was recently re-opened and

it is expected that some working arrangement will be reached along the lines of those arrived at in other mixed cities, (e.g., Famagusta). At the beginning of June in UNFICYP offices, a meeting was arranged between the EAC representative and the Turkish Cypriot Vice-Chairman of EAC, to discuss in general the possible restoration of EAC operations in the Turkish Cypriot Sector in Nicosia. There was willingness on both sides to continue discussions and to achieve some early agreement on this subject.

75. Postal Services. Through verbal agreements with the Director of Posts and the Turkish Cypriot spokesman on postal questions, the dispatch of mail from the Chief Post Office functioning in the Greek Cypriot Sector of Nicosia to the Turkish Cypriot Sector of the Capital was resumed on 17 April with the aid of UNFICYP Military Liaison Officers. After mail had been sent across on six occasions, however, this arrangement was stopped due to the fact that a letter, which it was understood the Turkish Cypriots would send to UNFICYP, confirming recognition of the authority of the Director of Posts and the abandonment of the use of an irregular cancellation, had not been received. The irregular cancellation by the Turkish Cypriots, however, was given up.

76. On 20 April mail was sent from the Post Office in the Turkish Cypriot Sector to the Chief Post Office, again with the aid of a UNFICYP Military Liaison Officer. This has continued without interruption. On 1 June, the Acting Director of Posts, following a suggestion from UNFICYP, sent across to the Turkish Cypriot Sector all postal warrants for retired government employees receiving retirement pensions.

77. Despite constant efforts, it has not been possible so far to complete negotiations for the restoration of normal postal services throughout Cyprus. One point at issue is the insistence of Turkish Cypriots that all Turkish Cypriot postal officers be paid retroactively in full, since their attendance for duty can be verified. This the Government is not ready to agree to at the present stage. There is disagreement also on the procedure for releasing postal parcels held in customs stores since December. An unknown number of these parcels was reported to have been looted during the height of the disturbances. As a consequence, serious inconvenience and considerable financial loss have been caused to exporters in other countries and to Cypriot importers.

78. Because of the disruption of postal services, certain social insurance benefits paid by postal draft have not been received by the addressees. Efforts are being made to have these treated in the same manner as the postal drafts for retired government employees.

79. The Director of Posts states that mail services to Turkish Cypriots in Famagusta, Larnaca and Limassol continue to be normal.

80. A revised set of ten proposals for the normalization of postal services was submitted by UNFICYP on 25 May, and although there are indications of agreement on most of the proposals, neither the Government nor the Turkish Cypriot spokesman had given a formal reply by 8 June. In the meantime, UNFICYP has prepared a draft plan aimed at reviving the role of Postal Agents in Turkish Cypriot villages with the assistance of local UNFICYP Military Liaison Officers.

81. Payment of Social Insurance Benefits. One result of the disturbances has been that many Turkish Cypriots, particularly in Nicosia and in Turkish Cypriot villages, are not receiving benefits to which they are entitled, under the Social Insurance Law 1956. Circumstances contributing to this are the partial disruption of postal services, the fact that employment exchanges which administer and in several instances pay out social insurance benefits are in almost all cases situated in Greek Cypriot sectors and the absence of temporary measures to give effect to the provisions of the Law during this abnormal period. UNFICYP is gathering information on the precise extent to which the benefits provided for under the Law are not at present reaching those entitled to receive them. The President of the Republic has stated his desire that social insurance benefits should continue to be paid and it is hoped that this situation will be rectified in the near future. It appears, however, that a number of detailed claims, submitted through UNFICYP on 8 May, are still subject to policy decisions by Government authorities.

Agricultural problems

82. Harvesting. Difficulties were expected in the harvesting of field crops, mainly barley and wheat, in areas where Greek or Turkish Cypriot villages and fields are adjoining or have been abandoned. UNFICYP, therefore, undertook early in May to make arrangements for the inspection of the crops and for the actual

harvesting in these areas. These arrangements were a result of negotiations with the Government and with representatives of the Turkish Cypriot community. The good offices of UNFICYP were also used to ensure the delivery to the Cyprus Grain Commission of considerable stocks of grain harvested in 1963 but still stored in Turkish Cypriot village co-operatives throughout the island. The harvesting has so far proceeded well. The barley crop has been largely harvested in the adjoining fields and work is continuing in the abandoned areas. In each case the local commander of UNFICYP has made all the necessary arrangements with the district and local authorities and the Turkish Cypriot harvesting Committees established for this purpose. The joint patrols (an officer and Greek and Turkish language interpreters), attached to each military zone or district, have been in constant touch with the local units of the UNFICYP and have helped to clear up difficulties at the local level. Whenever necessary, special problems have been referred to the Political staff at UNFICYP Headquarters in Nicosia for negotiations with the appropriate central authorities. In many abandoned areas there has been considerable destruction of crops by grazing and a number of cases of unauthorized harvesting. Within the Nicosia Zone (Nicosia and Kyrenia civil districts) where the destruction and unauthorized harvesting is likely to be worst, the total is expected to amount to 50-60 per cent of the crops in the abandoned areas. However, in the island as a whole, the crops lost are unlikely to exceed 5 per cent of the total. Unfortunately, the farmers hardest hit are precisely those, mainly belonging to the Turkish Cypriot Community, who have already suffered losses through the abandonment of their homes and property. Efforts are being made to arrange for payment to the owners or return of the grain in cases of unauthorized harvesting, but no progress has been made in any discussions with the Government of the question of general compensation or economic assistance to farmers whose crops have been destroyed in abandoned or difficult areas. This remains a matter of concern to UNFICYP. Considering the plight of the individual villagers deriving their main income from the crops, failure to reach a satisfactory solution may contribute to increased tension in the island. An over-all assessment of the results of the harvesting arrangements must await the completion of the wheat harvest which in certain areas is just beginning. However, barring events leading to new tensions among the villages, no major difficulties are expected.

83. Delivery of 1963 crop. The delivery of the 1963 grain to the Cyprus Grain Commission was essential to make storage room for the new crop. This involved a major operation in which UNFICYP played an essential role. Following an agreement between the Grain Commission and Turkish Cypriot business representatives, reached through the good offices of UNFICYP, a representative of the Force, accompanied by a Turkish speaking interpreter, visited each village to obtain an inventory of the quantity and present state of the grain stored with the local co-operative. At the same time, discussions were held regarding special arrangements for supervision by UNFICYP of the loading of the grain and the transport to stores of the Grain Commission in the various districts. The target date for the completion of the whole operation was 15 June, but there have been some delays in certain districts, mainly due to a shortage of trucks. The total amount of grain to be moved in this way is approximately 7,100 tons. At the present time UNFICYP is helping to negotiate the financial liabilities of the Turkish Cypriot Co-operatives to the Grain Commission and the arrangements for deliveries of 1964 crop from the Turkish Cypriot Co-operatives to the Grain Commission's stores. There is only one difficulty left open concerning the financial guarantees for which the Grain Commission requests guarantees from a British bank instead of from the local Turkish Cypriot banks.

84. Citrus Orchards. During April and May arrangements were made by UNFICYP for the maintenance of citrus orchards belonging to Greek or Turkish Cypriots who have left their villages or have difficulties reaching their orchards. Surveys were first carried out by experts from the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), stationed at the Agricultural Research Institute in Nicosia, and by a Political Officer from UNFICYP to determine the condition of the trees and the irrigation equipment required. In each case, reports were filed with the Government and the Turkish Cypriot Agriculture Officer. In the light of these surveys negotiations were undertaken with the local authorities and representatives of citrus orchard owners regarding measures to provide for irrigation and minimum cultivation needed to save the orchards. Arrangements were made in each case so that the necessary work in Turkish Cypriot-owned citrus orchards would be done by Greek Cypriots living in the village, and vice versa, against agreed payment by the owners. Only in exceptional cases has it been necessary to organize escorts by the UNFICYP in order to bring representatives of the owners from other villages to the

abandoned orchards. The problem resulting from missing equipment is being temporarily solved by the use of mobile water pumps or through the purchase of water from neighbouring orchards. To facilitate irrigation, the pooling of water resources has been agreed upon in several localities. Details regarding financing, irrigation schedules, inspections, the use of mobile pumps, etc., are now being worked out in each case. There still remain some problems regarding the financing of the irrigation and cultivation work and the purchase of mobile pumps. These are connected with the economic difficulties by which many villagers are affected through lack of income from their properties and unemployment. It is expected that solutions will be found to these difficulties and that work will begin in all orchards by the end of June. The arrangements for the maintenance of the orchards are expected to have considerable economic value since it requires several years for citrus trees to become productive. The fact that Greek and Turkish Cypriot villagers have agreed to assist each other in the manner described has helped to create goodwill and renew contacts which will be of value in efforts to improve relations between the two Communities in the Island.

Trade

85. Export of Strawberries. In April, UNFICYP negotiated this matter with the full co-operation of the Cyprus Regular Police. Arrangements were made to export strawberries from Limnitis through Nicosia Airport to London. The few technical difficulties which arose during the period of export were settled and did not hamper this operation.

86. Imported goods from Famagusta. At the end of April, following the requests from the Turkish Cypriot importers for safe transport of their goods from Famagusta to Nicosia, and also from the Vice-President, a decision was taken to give UNFICYP escort to a convoy transporting goods from Famagusta to Nicosia once a week. A new arrangement for regular supervision at road blocks and check points has been established from 7 June.

Private enterprise

87. Cold Stores. The Cold Stores of Greek Cypriot property in Nicosia represent about 50 per cent of the refrigerating capacity of the Island and are economically

important for Cyprus, especially during the Summer period. Up to May, the Turkish Cypriot representatives refused to make any move in the matter and to agree to revive the agreement from last January and February for the gradual removal of remaining foodstuffs from the Cold Stores. UNFICYP succeeded first in getting two Greek Cypriot mechanics entry to the property and keep the machinery running. At the beginning of May, the UNFICYP Commander made a decision that part of the foodstuff there could be taken for UNFICYP and an inspection was made by British Food Analysts from Famagusta. Their report revealed that most all the products in the Cold Stores were unfit for consumption. On this basis, clearance was obtained from the Turkish Cypriot side to remove remaining foodstuffs from the Cold Stores. All details for this operation were arranged with the help of UNFICYP military personnel. The operation was completed on 2 June 1964. At this time, it is proceeding with the necessary cleaning and repair in the Cold Stores. Still under consideration is the question of ice production.

88. Flour Mills. In April, and at the beginning of May, negotiations started with the Cyprus Government Grain Commission for a steady supply of wheat to the Turkish Cypriot Flour Mill. The Grain Commission decided that the Mill will be supplied with a quantity of wheat up to 1,000 tons a month, a quantity which is higher than the supply before December last. The Grain Commission has approved the direct delivery of part of the 1965 wheat crop from the Turkish Cypriot Co-operatives to the stores of the Mill.

89. Other Private Enterprises. In April, negotiations started for the possible restoration of operations of some Turkish Cypriot plants in the Cease-Fire area in Nicosia. At that time the owners asked for a postponement in operations of the plants in connexion with tension in that area. After a slight relaxation of this tension, on their own initiative, some of them started production in their factories (Sun-Macaroni factory, Cyprus Steel Wool Corporation, Lion Stocking Manufacturer, and Cheese Factory). Other economic and business problems were negotiated and settled at local level, especially the removal of goods for some shops in the Walled City of Nicosia. No progress has been achieved in the restoration of operations of Greek Cypriot enterprises in the Turkish Cypriot sector. Most of these enterprises are located in the Omorphita area.

90. Missing vehicles. UNFICYP has been handed a list of 115 motor cars and motorcycles belonging to Greek Cypriots which have been reported missing. While it will be extremely difficult to trace many of these vehicles, the assistance of UNFICYP Civilian Police is being offered to the Cypriot Police to the extent of attempting to identify vehicles on these lists and report their whereabouts to the Cypriot Police.

Displaced persons

91. Relief. The main relief work has been performed by a voluntary body, under the auspices of the International Committee of the Red Cross, called the Joint Relief Commission. The Joint Relief Commission was established under arrangements between the Cyprus Government and the ICRC.

92. The Joint Relief Commission consists of the British Red Cross and the Saint John Ambulance which is a voluntary private British society. These two organizations have drawn from their own funds the necessary amount to finance the Cyprus operation. However, these two organizations will end their mission at the end of June 1964 and negotiations are under way in order that work of the Joint Relief Commission can continue after that date. The direction of the Joint Relief Commission will be taken over by a person already appointed by the ICRC. All the field teams were British personnel and they will be withdrawn, but it is possible that some Swiss welfare workers will be assigned to the Commission. Efforts have to be made in order to have the Joint Relief Commission continue its work after those two British organizations leave. According to information received from the Joint Relief Commission, there are approximately 55,000 Turkish Cypriots in need of relief in the form of basic foodstuffs and medical supplies. Of the total number, approximately 16,900 have left their homes and moved to other villages and towns. Of these, about 60 per cent are living in the Nicosia and Kyrenia Districts. It is reported that a total of eighty-six villages have received refugees. The supplies for the relief rations and other aid such as clothes and medicines have been donated to the Turkish Cypriot Communal Chamber by the Turkish Red Crescent Society with Headquarters in Ankara. Five shipments consisting of approximately 3231 tons have so far arrived in Cyprus. The distribution of relief is done by Turkish Cypriot Committees with the co-operation of the Joint Relief Commission. The latter has six district teams which assess village needs and assist in practical matters concerning relief work.

The Commission has also provided foodstuffs and medical supplies from its own stock. Despite overcrowding and temporary housing, the sanitary conditions have remained satisfactory. Some Joint Relief Commission supplies have been made available to the Government Welfare Department for assistance to Greek Cypriots who have lost their homes or been affected by loss of income as a result of the situation. The relief operations have been co-ordinated by UNFICYP within the framework of the peace-keeping functions. At the same time measures should be taken in selected areas to encourage refugees to return to their villages in order to minimize the need for relief and promote a gradual return to more normal conditions of life.

93. Refugee camps in Nicosia. Around Nicosia there exist three refugee camps where 1,500 persons are living in tents. Over half of them are children and there is great concern about their health during the summer months when the heat will cause dehydration, particularly in the very young and the old. UNFICYP is building provisional sun-shaded bamboo roofs which will be used as shelters during the hottest period of the day. With the co-operation of the UNFICYP engineering corps, a provisional classroom will be built to encourage the continuation of school classes, using a provisional construction of cables and bamboo mats. This construction could be used until the rainy season starts next September. Some open-air showers are also being installed where at certain times of the day water could be sprayed over the children.

Damage of Property

94. In the last two weeks, UNFICYP has begun a survey of the properties damaged during the events of December 1963 and January 1964. This survey has been initiated in the Turkish Cypriot villages. From one hundred villages in which damage had been reported by the interested community, thirty-five have already been checked. In these thirty-five villages it was found that approximately 300 houses are in need of rebuilding and about the same number requiring repairs. This survey continues to the rest of the Turkish Cypriot villages and mixed villages, and it is expected to be extended to the Greek Cypriot villages. A special inquiry had been made in the Omorphita area, a suburb of Nicosia. In this area about forty Greek Cypriot houses and 120 Turkish Cypriot houses had been destroyed, and 100 Greek Cypriot and 500 Turkish Cypriot houses partially

damaged. The population in the area at the end of 1963 was about 5,000 Turkish Cypriots living in approximately 1,000 houses and 2,000 Greek Cypriots living in 400 houses. In the last two weeks some of the Greek Cypriots have returned to Omorphita and have started repairing some of their houses. UNFICYP expects after the completion of the survey of properties to prepare a plan for reconstruction and repair of properties and present it to the consideration of the Government and the leaders of both communities. For this purpose, studies have been carried out concerning the cost of an average house in rural and urban regions. Information has also been collected on cost of building materials and the availability of these materials, from the local manufacturers and importers.

The Judiciary and the Law Courts

Functioning of the Courts

95. The greatest impediments to the proper functioning of the courts of law and to a restoration of the normal administration of justice, have been encountered in Nicosia. The Courts of Justice building is situated within the Turkish Cypriot sector of the city controlled by Turkish Cypriots. The Greek Cypriot cases have been conducted and disposed of in the buildings of the Constitutional Court (which is not functioning). The cases involving Turkish Cypriot defendants and entirely Turkish Cypriot parties are also being dealt with on the Turkish side. All cases involving members of both communities or involving police officials of one side and accused persons of the other have been held up by reason of the situation. Furthermore, all records and archives of the Law Courts are still housed in the Law Courts building within the Turkish sector and cannot be utilized by the Ministry of Justice of the Department of the Attorney-General.

96. With a view to attempting a measure of return to normal conditions, the Government has decided to set up a temporary Law Courts building as near as possible to the "Green Line" in the hope that Turkish Cypriot judges and Turkish Cypriot citizens would thereby feel more secure and be able to attend. However, this hope seems futile as far as the Turkish Cypriot police personnel are concerned, since the Government refuses to recognize Turkish Cypriot police personnel unless they are prepared to acknowledge the authority of the Minister of the Interior. For these reasons, an early return to normal functioning of the District Courts of Nicosia city is most unlikely, and almost all the mixed trials will be further delayed.

97. On the other hand, there have been some encouraging signs with regard to the functioning of the High Court of Justice where Turkish judges have begun, during the last few weeks, to come to the Greek Cypriot side of the city to perform their professional functions. This has been made possible by the efforts of the President of the High Court (Mr. Justice Wilson), who retired on 31 May 1964, and partly by the exertions of UNFICYP which has provided escorts and assured individual judges their personal security. A few Turkish Cypriot lawyers have also begun, very reluctantly, to come to the Greek sector to argue appeal cases before the High Court and their transport and personal security were again assured by UNFICYP.

98. In the rest of the Island. In the seven judicial districts throughout the rest of the island, the problems of the functioning of the law courts are less acute. In most cases, the Courts are functioning by and large, and where such functioning has broken down the reason has been the refusal by the Turkish Cypriot judges to attend Courts situated in the Greek Cypriot section of the town, alleging fear for their personal security. Here too, however, some progress has been made and Assize Courts have been held by Turkish Cypriot judges in Limassol where they were escorted by UNFICYP. The Turkish Cypriot district judge has also been travelling to Limassol to perform his judicial functions without any interruption during the last few weeks. UNFICYP has assured the Turkish Cypriot judge protection to proceed to Paphos to perform his professional functions there.

99. Salaries of Judges. One noteworthy feature has been that throughout the period the salaries of the Turkish Cypriot judges have been paid and are continuing to be paid by the Government. The Turkish Cypriot judges are the only Turkish Cypriot public servants now receiving their salaries.

IV

UNFICYP'S PROGRAMME OF ACTION

(AS SET FORTH IN PARAGRAPHS 3 OF ANNEX I OF
SECURITY COUNCIL DOCUMENT S/5671)

100. No progress has been achieved with regard to removal of emplacements, fortifications and trenches in areas of Nicosia with the exception of the Ledra Palace Hotel building. All arms have been removed from this building, in which is located the office of the United Nations Mediator. No more armed men are in the gardens surrounding the building. Trenches and sand-bags have also been removed from the gardens.
101. As stated in the previous section of this report, a survey has been carried out on property damage in the Omorphita area. Some Greek Cypriots are rebuilding their homes in this area but no Turkish Cypriots have returned nor are they willing to go back unless complete security is assured for their lives and property.
102. UNFICYP police have been placed as observers at most police check posts. UNFICYP patrols have been increased at the main roads. While improper searches still exist, there has been a reduction of such improper acts.
103. UNFICYP civilian police have conducted some inquiries into certain incidents in which people have been killed. These reports have been forwarded to the Secretary-General and in some cases their conclusions have been communicated to the proper authorities in Cyprus. UNFICYP has no indication, however, that these authorities have not taken follow-up action on the conclusions of these reports.
104. The question of reintegration of the Turkish Cypriot policemen into the Cyprus police force is closely related to the final political solution. At this stage, any plan for such reintegration has been rejected.
105. As indicated in Section III, some improvements have been obtained in certain economic sectors. Public services, namely, water and electricity, are being provided in Ktima and there is no disruption of such services in any important town or city in the island.
106. In spite of the constant efforts by UNFICYP to facilitate the return of Turkish Cypriot officials to their positions in Government service, no progress can be reported. There are, however, some good prospects in the postal services.

107. The possibility of establishing, in certain areas, Cypriot Greek-Turkish-UNFICYP joint patrols has been explored. At the present moment these suggestions have not received any positive consideration.

108. The possibility of official meetings of Greek and Turkish Cypriots seems to be excluded for the time being. UNFICYP has succeeded in organizing joint meetings between businessmen and between interested persons in the working of the Cyprus Grain Commission of both communities. At the local level, frequent meetings are taking place between responsible people of both communities.

V

SUMMING UP AND OBSERVATIONS

109. UNFICYP continues to carry on its assignment within the established framework, which is: to prevent a recurrence of fighting; to attempt to reconcile and relax tensions; and to contribute to a return to normal conditions by seeking accommodations for day to day living, while avoiding, in doing so, any actions that could reasonably be interpreted by either side as prejudicial to its ultimate political interests.

110. No military clashes of any significance have occurred in this period. Hence, one of the major objectives of the United Nations operation, namely "to prevent a recurrence of fighting", is being accomplished. The presence of United Nations troops in sensitive areas throughout the island has undoubtedly restrained both sides and discouraged recourse to arms. UNFICYP now encounters no difficulty in sending its detachments to any part of the island and therefore enjoys complete freedom of movement. However, tensions have not substantially lessened, and both sides have taken advantage of the lull in fighting to strengthen their military positions and to improve their ability to undertake military operations in the future. It is also evident that the inventory of arms within the country has grown substantially through smuggling, by both communities, and from importation by the Government.

111. The agricultural economy of the country has not been seriously impaired, as yet. Favourable weather conditions have contributed to a normal crop and over-all damage caused by belligerent action is not significant, although the Turkish Cypriots have been more adversely affected. Under UNFICYP's protection, the current harvesting has been proceeding without incident.

112. Industrial activities, however, have been seriously affected and many factories are not in operation for one reason or another, arising from the unsettled conditions in the country. Many commercial establishments were looted during the December clashes and those in the vicinity of the "Green Line", understandably, still remain closed to business. The economic pinch is already being felt seriously by the Turkish Cypriot community and will soon start to be of significance to the Greek Cypriots as well. The very promising tourist trade of last summer is now

non-existent. However, it seems that economic considerations are not likely to be a serious factor affecting political decisions in the immediate future.

113. With the exception of the Kyrenia Road and the road extending west from Xeros through Limnitis, Mansoura and Kokkina, all main roads throughout the country have been opened without restriction to Greek Cypriots. The freedom of movement of Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, in practice has been limited by reason of the checks, excessive searches, and the feeling of insecurity and fear of arbitrary arrest or abduction experienced by Turkish Cypriots, as well as by many unnecessary petty obstructions put in their way, very often on the whims of armed "irregulars" of the Greek Cypriot community. However, lack of movement by Turkish Cypriots outside of their areas is believed also to be dictated by a political purpose, namely, to reinforce the claim that the two main communities of Cyprus cannot live peacefully together in the island without some sort of geographical separation. UNFICYP has provided a degree of security by temporarily escorting Turkish Cypriots and their goods to their destinations, a practice which has been recently replaced by increased UNFICYP patrols and check points in sensitive areas. UNFICYP's presence along main roads has made possible an adequate flow of produce into the Nicosia market, and products for export have moved without serious difficulty to the ports. For instance, the last week in May registered the highest weekly record for the export of potatoes.

114. Automatic arms are in the hands of large numbers of irregular fighters on both sides. The Government on the one hand and the Turkish Cypriot leaders on the other appear to have only tenuous control over most of these elements. Irresponsible acts by these highly emotional fighters on either side cannot be ruled out, and could certainly provoke reactions similar to those brought about by the Famagusta incident of 11 May 1964, which set back many weeks of patient work by UNFICYP.

115. The Turkish Army national contingent remains astride the Kyrenia Road at Orta Key/Geunyely, and on one occasion objected to United Nations patrolling in their area, which nevertheless continues. The Greek Army national contingent remains in its barracks on the outskirts of Nicosia. There are some indications that during recent weeks, both of these units have been involved in aiding the local forces of their respective communities. In any case, their presence on the island is a problem, because of their obviously one-sided attitudes.

116. The Greek Army contingent would readily place itself under United Nations command, remain in its barracks and possibly withdraw from the island if a similar arrangement could be made with the Turkish Army contingent. The Turkish troops, in my view, actually no longer serve any imperative security purpose that the far larger and stronger United Nations Force could not perform. The continued deployment of Turkish troops cannot greatly add to the security of the Turkish Cypriots over and above the security that UNFICYP could afford them, while their presence cannot avoid acutely aggravating and agitating the Greek Cypriot Government and community. Consequently, I consider it reasonable to urge that the Turkish Army contingent should now either retire to its barracks voluntarily and remain there, or accept my long-standing offer to take it under United Nations command, although not as a contingent in UNFICYP. This, of course, would certainly mean the return of the Turkish troops to their barracks. However, the condition advanced up to now by Turkish officials for agreeing to place the Turkish contingent under United Nations command is unacceptable, since it would so limit UNFICYP authority over the contingent as to render UN command meaningless.

117. The practice of abducting people and holding them as hostages or killing them in retaliation is most reprehensible. It has been employed by both communities, but, because of the circumstances, to a considerably greater extent by Greek Cypriots. The taking of hostages is prohibited by international law, and the killing of hostages is a universally recognized war crime. Where such killings have occurred, they have to be branded only as cold-blooded murders. It is bad enough that such inhumanity can occur in these times; it is far worse that in no instance has anyone suspected of guilt been found, charged and tried. President Makarios has condemned these acts and I agree with him that they create throughout the world a bad image of the people and Government of Cyprus, indicating, as they seem to do, an inability on the part of governmental authority to check and control shocking excesses of this kind.

118. The decision by the Government of Cyprus to institute conscription in connexion with the organization of the National Guard to assist the security forces of the state, is an act of government. It might, to be sure, contribute to an improvement in the discipline and definition of status of those bearing arms in Cyprus, and thereby increase control over the present irregulars. Nevertheless,

in view of the actual circumstances in Cyprus, it may be questioned whether such a decision at this time could be considered to be consistent with the resolution of the Security Council of 4 March 1964, with specific reference to its paragraph 1. The conscription does not in practice apply, of course, to Turkish Cypriots. But it does arouse apprehension both in Turkey and the Turkish community of Cyprus.

119. The recurrent threats of landing in Cyprus by Turkish military forces are most unhelpful to the efforts of the United Nations to restore normal conditions and to prevent fighting in the island of Cyprus. Such threats serve as well to make the Turkish Cypriot leadership less amenable to the acceptance of arrangements designed to contribute to a return to normality in the island. The most recent threat of this kind, which occurred only a week or so ago, touched off considerable excitement both within and outside of Cyprus. Such actions are certainly not consistent with the appeal made to all Member States by the Security Council in paragraph 1 of its resolution of 4 March.

120. The problem of arms in Cyprus is critical. Indeed, it may be the decisive factor in determining the ability of the United Nations effort in Cyprus to succeed. There is no question, of course, that the smuggling of arms, whether by Turkish or Greek Cypriots, is illegal and that UNFICYP is entitled to try to check it. It would seem also not subject to question that a sovereign Government normally is entitled to import and/or manufacture arms. With regard to Cyprus, the question is whether at the present time and in the present circumstances, the import and manufacture of arms by the Government of Cyprus is within the letter and/or spirit of the Security Council resolution of 4 March. This problem of arms relates very directly to certain other problems. When the Government of Cyprus is approached by us on the matter of curtailing arms imports, they insist that their concern is directed exclusively at the threat of invasion by Turkey and that the types of arms sought are for this purpose only. The threat implicit in the continued deployment in Cyprus of the Turkish contingent is also cited in this context. I do not doubt that the return of the Turkish troops to their barracks, and an end to threats of imminent Turkish landings, would greatly facilitate UNFICYP's efforts to bring the arms situation in Cyprus under control.

121. An account of the progress achieved until now in the implementation of the programme of action which I outlined to the Security Council in Annex I to my

report of 29 April 1964 (S/5671) has been summarized in section IV. While UNFICYP has been able to move forward in certain aspects of its mandate, it is rapidly reaching a point where further progress can only be made if Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and particularly their leaders, are willing to show more flexibility in their political positions. Initiatives by UNFICYP designed to further the return to normal conditions meet more often than not with refusals by one party or the other because they fear an impingement upon their ultimate political aims.

122. The three months' operational period of UNFICYP expires on 27 June 1964. The question thus arises as to the future. Will the need for the United Nations Force in Cyprus, on the basis of which the Security Council took its action of 4 March to create that Force, still obtain on and after 27 June? And is there a practical possibility that it can be extended? I think it clearly advisable in the light of the demonstrated usefulness of this Force in the Cyprus situation, as described in this report, to extend it for another three-month period as from 27 June. From the standpoint of planning and other arrangements for which I am responsible, it would, of course, be preferable to have an indefinite extension, but for practical reasons particularly relating to the financing of the Force, this would seem next to impossible. I have been consulting on this question of extension informally with individual members of the Security Council and with representatives of the States providing contingents and making the voluntary monetary contributions for the support of the Force. These consultations have revealed a general acceptance of the fact that an extension of the Force is necessary and desirable, and have indicated that if the Security Council should decide to extend the Force on more or less the same basis as now exists, the States providing contingents would be disposed to continue to provide them upon request.

123. I have, of course, inquired of the Government of Cyprus as to their views on extension of the Force and have received informal indications that their response would be favourable; but I am awaiting a formal reply.

124. At present, due largely, it would appear, to the presence of the Force, there is no fighting in Cyprus, quiet prevails, and there has been no fighting of consequence for quite some time. The extension of the Force may continue to prevent a recurrence of fighting, as the Force is called upon to do by the Council's resolution of 4 March, although, naturally, there can be no certainty about this.

It is more than likely, however, that the withdrawal of the Force at this time would lead to an early resumption of fighting, which might well develop into heavy conflict.

125. If the Security Council decides to extend the Force, I regret to have to report that it will be necessary to obtain a new Commander for it.


General P.S. Gyani, the Commander of the Force, informed me before undertaking this assignment that for compelling personal reasons it would not be possible for him to continue in this capacity beyond the original three months' tour of duty, that is, 27 June. He has recently reiterated the necessity of his being relieved in response to an inquiry from me as to whether his circumstances have changed in such a way as to permit him to consider service beyond 27 June. In expressing regret, he has informed me that his situation has not changed and that he must leave the Command by the end of this month. General Gyani has rendered highly distinguished service to the United Nations in the exercise of his Command in Cyprus. He has demonstrated great competence both in the military and diplomatic spheres. I am deeply grateful for the substantial contribution he has made. In view of the eventuality of having to appoint a new Commander of the Force if the Security Council should extend it beyond 27 June, I have made an exploratory approach to General Kodendera Subayya Thimayya of India, former Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army, who is now retired. General Thimayya has indicated to me that he would be available should I call upon him, and it is my intention to appoint him as Commander of the Force under paragraph 4 of the Council's resolution of 4 March, if the Force is in fact extended.

126. The approximate amount of pledges in the form of voluntary contributions for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the Force in its initial period is approximately \$5,500,000. The provisional estimate of the United Nations financial obligations for the operation of UNFICYP for the three-month period ending 27 June totals \$5,430,000. If the Force should be extended for a second three months, it is estimated that the additional costs will approximate \$7,300,000. This increased amount for the second period is due primarily to the anticipated claims of certain Governments providing contingents to the Force for what are described as "one-time costs" in respect of equipment and supplies taken to Cyprus and also to the fact that not all units were in Cyprus for the full

period of the first three months. Should the Force be extended, it will remain to be determined whether this increased amount could be raised through voluntary contributions. I have no assurance of this at present.

127. I feel bound to point out that, although I well understand the reasons for it and realize that there is little or no possibility of change, the method of financing the Cyprus Force as defined in the Security Council resolution of 4 March, is most unsatisfactory. Since funds are available only through voluntary contributions, there is a large degree of uncertainty about what will be actually available, and therefore the planning and advance arrangements essential to an efficient and economical operation are sorely hampered.

128. Parallel with the operations of the peace-keeping force, efforts at promoting by mediation a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the Cyprus problem, as envisaged in paragraph 7 of the resolution of 4 March 1964, have been maintained continuously since I designated Ambassador Sakari Tuomioja as the Mediator on 25 March. In accordance with the terms of reference set out in the resolution, the Mediator has throughout the period been in consultation with the representatives of the Cyprus communities and with the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, seeking to find a sufficient measure of common ground on which to encourage the parties to develop the basis for a long-term solution of the problem. Given the circumstances which have prevailed in Cyprus, including the very wide differences between the political viewpoints and objectives of the leaders of the communities, the task of the Mediator could not have been expected to be an easy one, nor likely to lead to positive results in a relatively short time. The Mediator's experience has confirmed this and he will continue his patient endeavours with the parties concerned, while reporting periodically to me as envisaged by the resolution of 4 March. It will be recalled that, unlike the mandate of the peace-keeping force, that of the Mediator does not prescribe any fixed period.



The boundaries shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.